Paris Agreement Carbon Pricing
Under the system proposed by Brazil, there would be no appropriate adjustment if the CO2 discharge unit left the country for the first time, but there would be adjustments for all subsequent transfers between other countries of that unit. Mendes adds that it is also worth mapping the subfield of carbon pricing institutes because of their place in the climate-energy-Nexus complex (see Chapter 1). Unlike the reform of fossil fuel and renewable energy subsidies, carbon pricing is explicitly climate-oriented. As a result, the UNFCCC plays a central role among institutions that promote carbon pricing, but there are also many other institutions with little or no connection to the UNFCCC, which have been very active in promoting carbon prices. We therefore examine the general degree of coherence between institutions and focus on the dyatic interdependence between the UNFCCC and the institutions integrated into the World Bank. Finally, with regard to governance functions, the implementation of similar functions (including information and networking, see Table 6.1) overlaps considerably at the global level, but also in the event of a divergence that has covered most governance functions. In many cases, public, private and hybrid institutions perform similar governance functions to achieve similar or related objectives. For example, ICAP (public), NCM (hybrid) and IETA (private) are all working to promote the interconnection of carbon markets through information and networking. They therefore overlap in terms of their functioning (governance functions and CHARBON markets) but represent different members who have potentially different preferences, for example.
B IETA, which represents the interests of the carbon market, and ICAP the interests of the emissions trading policy. While all institutions have promoted carbon markets, co2 taxes have been introduced almost exclusively by public and especially hybrid institutions, including the CPLC and the PMR. This is not surprising, as the private institutions concerned were created to promote the proper functioning of carbon markets (with the exception of C4C, which advocates that companies set an internal price for shadow carbon). A more interesting development is a clear gap between the almost exclusive concentration on carbon markets and the increasing parallel promotion of CO2 taxes. We will continue to discuss this development if we focus on World Bank institutions in a later section. The fact that the basic standard has been interpreted differently and that the sub-field is characterized by an average number of institutions (less than the institutions dealing with renewable energy sources, rather than those dealing with fossil fuel subsidies) also implies that it is difficult to predict the degree of coherence and management of the subsector.